Generalized Secure Distributed Source Coding with Side Information by Salimi, Somayeh et al.
1 
 
Generalized Secure Distributed Source Coding with Side Information1 
Somayeh Salimi1, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh2, Mohammad Reza Aref1 
1ISSL Lab., Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran 
2Electronics Research Center, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran 
Email: salimi@ee.sharif.edu, salmasi@sharif.edu, aref@sharif.edu 
Abstract. In this paper, new inner and outer bounds on the achievable compression-equivocation 
rate region for generalized secure data compression with side information are given that do not 
match in general. In this setup, two senders, Alice and Charlie intend to transmit information to 
Bob via channels with limited capacity so that he can reliably reconstruct their observations. The 
eavesdropper, Eve, has access to one of the channels at each instant and is interested in the source 
of the same channel at the time. Bob and Eve also have their own observations which are 
correlated with Alice's and Charlie's observations. In this model, two equivocation and 
compression rates are defined with respect to the sources of Alice and Charlie. Furthermore, 
different special cases are discussed where the inner and outer bounds match. Our model covers 
the previously obtained results as well.   
Keywords: Information Theoretic Security, Secure Data Compression, Compression-
Equivocation Rate Region.  
1   Introduction 
Recently, much theoretical research has been dedicated to the problems of nodes with dense distribution and 
resource constraints. In such networks, nodes compress correlated data separately, without collaboration, which 
is known as distributed source coding. The nature of sensitive data in these networks necessitates secure 
compression while meeting quality of service requirement. 
                                                        
1
 Part of this work was accepted at WCC2009 [12] 
 
2 
 
In the classical wiretap channel model, considered by Wyner in [1], nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved 
without using a secure key if the intended receiver has a better quality communication channel than the 
eavesdropper. The idea of generating a shared secret key from the correlated observations has been explored 
vastly so far. Maurer [2] and Ahlswede and Csiszar [3] were researchers in this subject. On the other hand, in 
some applications like sensor networks, it is needed that the correlated information from different sources can be 
reconstructed by a node which has some other source of information. Simultaneously, the information sources 
should be kept secret from an eavesdropper as much as possible.  
In this paper, we explore the above mentioned problem, where two nodes must separately compress their 
sources in such a way that the eavesdropper with side information learns as little as possible about them. In our 
model, a general secure distributed compression problem is considered in which two transmitters Alice and 
Charlie, with correlated observations, intend to send information to a receiver, Bob, over noiseless channels with 
limited capacity in such a way that he can reconstruct both sources reliably. Also, there is an eavesdropper, Eve, 
who listens to either Alice or Charlie’s channel, one at a time, and when she listens to each of the sender’s 
channel, she is only interested in learning information about that sender’s source. Bob and Eve have their own 
side information correlated to Alice's and Charlie's observations. 
In the sequel, we aim at information source when we use the term source.   
1.1   Related Works 
In [4], Yamamoto addresses lossy compression with security constraints over a noisy broadcast channel in 
which the users share a secure key. It was shown that if the source is compressed at the first step and then 
encrypted using the secure key and finally transmitted over the noisy channel using wiretap channel code, the 
optimal strategy is selected. In some other works, the communication channels are considered noiseless. For 
example in [5] and [6], Yamamoto investigated the scheme where a sender observes the outcomes of two 
correlated sources and wishes to send information in such a way that one of the sources can be reconstructed at 
the receiver but the other is kept as secret as possible. A simplified but significant problem has been addressed 
by Prabhakaran and Ramchandran in [7] where Alice intends to send information to Bob to enable him to 
reconstruct her source and keep eavesdropper, Eve, as ignorant as possible about her source. In this problem, 
Bob and Eve have access to side information arbitrarily correlated to Alice’s source, and the minimum leakage 
rate in secure lossless compression is explored. The significance of [7] is explaining the point that in the case of 
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arbitrarily correlated side information at the eavesdropper, the usual Slepian-Wolf compression is not always 
sufficient.  
Secure lossless compression of two correlated sources is investigated in [8], where the related information of 
each source is sent over one channel and the eavesdropper has access to only one of the channels stream at any 
instant and wishes to get information about the sender’s source of that channel at that time. The problem 
explored in [8], by Luh and Kundur, is a simplified case in which eavesdropper has no side information and so 
Slepian-Wolf coding suffices to setup minimum leakage. In this situation, the compression-equivocation 
capacity region is given. In another scenario in [9] and [10], Gunduz et. al. have investigated a situation where 
Eve has only access to the Alice’s channel, and the other channel is secure. In this case, equivocation is 
calculated with respect to Alice’s source. In [9], transmitted data from Charlie acts as side information at Bob 
but in [10], there is an additional condition that Charlie’s source can be reconstructed by Bob. In both cases, 
inner and outer bounds on achievable compression-equivocation are given in [9] and [10]. 
1.2   Our Contribution 
It can be seen that the scenarios considered in [8], [9] and [10] can be regarded as special cases of a generalized 
scenario in which Alice's and Charlie’s sources should be reconstructed by Bob. The information related to 
Alice’s and Charlie’s sources is sent over relevant noiseless channel with limited capacity. In this scenario, Bob 
and Eve have access to side information arbitrarily correlated with Alice's and Charlie’s sources. Similar to [8], 
Eve has access to only one of the channels stream at any instant and wishes to get information about the 
sender’s source of that channel at that time. So, in this situation, two equivocation rates are defined and the inner 
and outer bounds on achievable compression-equivocation rates ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ are explored in which AR  and 
CR are the capacity of Alice’s and Charlie’s channels and A∆ and C∆  are the equivocations of Eve with respect 
to Alice’s and Charlie’s sources, respectively. In this generalized scenario, the Slepian-Wolf coding alone is not 
optimal and must be combined with random coding. Also, different cases are discussed and it can be seen that 
our results contain the results of the above mentioned references as the special cases.    
The paper is organized as follows. The generalized model is introduced in section 2. In section 3, inner and 
outer bounds of compression-equivocation rate region are given in theorems 1 and 2, respectively, which 
generalize the well known Slepian-Wolf region to include secrecy constraints. Different scenarios based on the 
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availability of the side information at the nodes are considered in section 4. The conclusion and the proofs of the 
theorems are included in section 5 and appendix, respectively. 
2   Generalized Model 
In the model shown in Fig.1, it is assumed that Alice and Charlie have access to observations of the length-N 
correlated source sequences NA and NC , respectively, and intend to transmit required information to Bob via 
noiseless but finite capacity channels so that Bob can reliably reconstruct these sources with access to side 
information sequences NB . The eavesdropper, Eve, with access to correlated side information NE can intercept 
only one of the channels at a time and at that time, is only interested in obtaining information about the related 
source of that channel. It is assumed that the observations , ,N N NA B C  and NE are generated independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with joint probability distribution ( , , , )ABCEP a b c e over the finite 
alphabet × × ×A B C E . In this model, while Alice and Charlie want to transmit required information to Bob 
simultaneously, each of them attempts to minimize the rate of information learned about her/his source by Eve. 
Concerning this, the equivocation of Eve with respect to each sources can be defined when Eve has access to the 
related channel. Throughout the paper, we assume that all the transmissions are authenticated, i.e., the 
eavesdropper is passive. 
Definition 1: A ( , , )A CM M N code for secure compression of the sources includes two stochastic encoding 
functions for Alice and Charlie, respectively, 
A
N
A Mf : I→A  and CNC Mf : I→C as well as a decoding 
function 
A C
N N N
M Mg : I I× × → ×B A C for Bob. In this setup, the equivocation of Eve with respect to Alice’s 
and Charlie’s sources is defined as (  ( ), )N N NA
1 H A f A E
N
 and (  ( ), )N N NC
1 H C f C E
N
, respectively, and the 
error probability is defined as Pr{ ( ( ), ( )) ( , )}N N N NA Cg f A f C A C≠ . 
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Fig. 1. Secure compression of two sources 
Definition 2: A rate quadruple ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ is said to be achievable if for any 0ε > , there exists 
a ( , , )A CM M N code such that: 
log( ) ( ),A AM N R ε≤ +    
log( ) ( ),C CM N R ε≤ +  
(  ( ), ) ( - )N N NA AH A f A E N ε≥ ∆  and  
     (  ( ), ) ( - )N N NC CH C f C E N ε≥ ∆ , where NeP ε< . 
The closure of all achievable rate quadruples ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ is compression-equivocation capacity region 
for which the inner and outer bounds are represented in section 3. 
3   Generalized Secure Compression of Sources 
If security is ignored in the problem described in the previous section, then it is reduced to a Slepian-Wolf 
coding of correlated sources [11]. Considering security in this problem makes it more complicated and it can not 
be considered as a simple extension of Slepian-Wolf problem. Some simpler cases of this problem are explored 
in [8],[9] and [10]. In [8], Eve has no side information and so, Slepian-Wolf coding strategy suffices. In [9], the 
situation is investigated where only Alice’s channel is intercepted by Eve while there is no need for Charlie’s 
source to be reconstructed by Bob, i.e. the information sent by Charlie has the role of side information at Bob 
and leads to less information leakage of Alice’s source. In [10] the condition of reconstructing Charlie’s source 
by Bob is added. In both last cases, Eve has access to side information.   
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For the setup described in definition 2, we give the inner and outer bounds of all 
achievable ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ which do not match in general. In this case, the Slepian-Wolf coding strategy does 
not suffice and the coding strategy of [10] is followed with the difference that security is an important issue for 
both senders and the scenario of [10] should be modified appropriately.  
Theorem 1 (inner bound): In the described setup ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ is achievable if:  
( , ) ( ; , , )                                                                       (1)
( , ) ( ; , , )                                                                       (2)        
A
C
R H A V B I A C U V B
R H C U B I A C U V B
≥ −
≥ −  
( , )                                                                                             (3)
max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}                                                                 
A C
A
R R H A C B
I A B C U I A E U
+ ≥
∆ ≤ −    (4)   
max{ ( , ; ) ( ; )}                                                                    (5)
max{ ( , ; , , ) ( ; ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )}                (6)
( )                 
C
A C
A A
I A B C V I C E V
I A C U V B I A C I A U E I C V E
R H A E
∆ ≤ −
∆ + ∆ ≤ + − −
+ ∆ ≥                                                                                 (7)  
( )                                                                                                 (8)   C CR H C E+ ∆ ≥
 
where the maximization is over the auxiliary random variables U and V that are according to the joint 
distribution ( , , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( )p a b c e u v p a b c e p u a p v c= .  
Theorem 2 (outer bound): In the described setup, if ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆  is achievable, the equations (9)-(18) 
hold for some auxiliary random variables U and V that form Markov chains as ( , , )U A B C E− − and 
( , , )V C A B E− − . 
( , ) ( ; , , )                                                                           (9)
( , ) ( ; , , )                                                                          (10)
A
C
R H A V B I A C U V B
R H C U B I A C U V B
≥ −
≥ −
( , )                                                                                              (11)
max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}                                                                
A C
A
R R H A C B
I A B V U I A E U
+ ≥
∆ ≤ −       (12)
max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}                                                                      (13)
( ; ) ( , )                                                                       
C
A C
I C B U V I C E V
R I A B H C A B
∆ ≤ −
∆ ≤ + −         (14)
( ; ) ( , )                                                                               (15)
( ; ) ( , ; )                                                                
C A
A C
R I C B H A B C
I A C I A C B
∆ ≤ + −
∆ + ∆ ≤ +                 (16)
( )                                                                                                  (17)
( )                                                        
A A
C C
R H A E
R H C E
+ ∆ ≥
+ ∆ ≥                                           (18)
 
The detailed proofs of both theorems are given in the appendix but some discussion is followed.  
In the mentioned problem, Alice and Charlie attempt to increase equivocation of Eve with respect to their 
own sources. In [10] Charlie’s channel was secure and he used his channel capacity as much as possible so that 
Alice could keep her source as secret as possible from Eve. A significant difference of our problem with the 
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problem in [10] is that Charlie is also attentive of his source security and so, most usage of his channel capacity 
is not a good strategy, necessarily. This makes the problem more complex and according to equations (6) and 
(16), there is a trade-off between the equivocation rates. In fact, in the achievability scheme, it can be assumed 
that first, Alice and Charlie transmit the auxiliary random variables U and V , respectively, which have 
distributions ( )p u a and ( )p v c . After that, they launch to transmit remainder of information which is required 
for Bob to reconstruct both sources. For this purpose, according to Slepian-Wolf theorem, Alice and Charlie 
should transmit some information with the overall rate ( , , , )H A C B U V at least, which is sent via random 
binning. This rate is divided between Alice and Charlie and this division determines the trade-off according to 
equation (6). 
Using the auxiliary random variables can potentially result in higher equivocation rates. This fact is shown in 
[7] via an example in the case that there is only one sender. In this binary erasure example, it is proved that 
transmitting part of information via an auxiliary random variable and the other part via Slepian-Wolf coding 
leaks less information to the eavesdropper compared to the situation where information is sent via Slepian-Wolf 
coding entirely. This fact is true in the case of two senders and two equivocation rates. However, when 
eavesdropper has no side information, Slepian-Wolf coding suffices and the maximum equivocation rates can be 
achieved by constant auxiliary random variables [7]. In addition, there are some other situations where constant 
random variables can result in maximum equivocation rates. 
Corollary 3.1: When eavesdropper’s side information E  is physically degraded with respect to B i.e. 
if A B E− − or C B E− − form Markov chains, thenU or V can be chosen constant, respectively. If both of 
Markov chains hold, then choosing both auxiliary random variables constant is optimum.   
We prove this corollary for auxiliary random variable U . For the random variable V the proof is similar. 
From equation (12) of theorem 2, the equivocation rate A∆  will be upper bounded as:  
 
max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )} max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}                   (19)
    max{ ( ; , , )} max{ ( , , ) ( , , , )}
    max{ ( , , ) ( , , )}                                                    
A I A B V U I A E U I A B C U I A E U
I A B C U E H B C U E H B C U A E
H B C U E H B C A E
∆ ≤ − ≤ −
≤ = −
= −              (20)
    ( , ) ( , , ) ( ; , )  H B C E H B C A E I A B C E≤ − =
  
where equation (19) follows from the data processing inequality and equation (20) is the direct result of Markov 
chain ( , , )U A B C E− − . On the other hand, this upper bound is achievable by setting ConstantU = and 
applying Markov chain A B E− −  in equation (4) of theorem 1. 
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4   Special Cases 
Now, we investigate some special cases. The first and also the simplest case is when eavesdropper has no 
side information or in other words, E is constant.  
Case 1.Eavesdropper with no side information: In this situation, the following corollary can be deduced.  
Corollary 4.1: When there is no side information at Eve, the inner and outer bounds match each other. The 
compression-equivocation capacity region is characterized by: 
( , )                                                                                             (21)
( , )                                                                                   
A
C
R H A B C
R H C A B
≥
≥           (22)
( , )                                                                                     (23)
[ ( ) ] min{ ( ; , ), ( ; ) ( , )}                 (24)
[ ( ) ] min{
A C
A A C
C C
R R H A C B
H A R I A B C R I A B H C A B
H C R
+
+
+ ≥
− ≤ ∆ ≤ + −
− ≤ ∆ ≤ ( , ; ), ( ; ) ( , )}                 (25)
( , ; ) ( ; ) ( ; , ) ( ; ) ( , ; ) ( ; )  (26)
A
A C
I A B C R I C B H A B C
I A C B I A C I A B C I B C I A B C I A B
+ −
∆ +∆ ≤ + = + = +
 
The achievability and converse of the corollary can be considered as a special case of theorems 1and 2 by 
setting the auxiliary random variable U and V constant and using Slepian-Wolf binning. It can be seen that this 
special case coincides in [8, theorem 1]. 
Some other special cases can be assumed when side information of Bob or Eve or both is accessible at Alice 
or Charlie. Hence, three cases can be considered when Alice has access to Bob’s or Eve’s side information or 
both. For simplicity, in these three cases, it is assumed that the channels from Alice and Charlie to Bob have 
infinite capacity and only the equivocation rates are considered.    
Case 2.Eavesdropper’s side information at Alice: In this case, it is assumed that Eavesdropper’s side 
information (source E ) is available at Alice and the following corollary can be obtained. 
Corollary 4.2: If Eve’s side information is available at Alice, ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆  is achievable if and only if: 
( ; , )                                                                                     (27)
( ; , )                                                                                     (28)
A
C
I A B C E
I C A B E
∆ ≤
∆ ≤
( ; , ) ( ; ) ( , ; ) ( ; )              (29)   A C I A B C E I B C E I A B C E I A B E∆ +∆ ≤ + = +
 
It can be shown that in this case, the best strategy is to establish U E= and V as constant value and transmit 
remainder information via Slepian-Wolf random binning. The rate of this remainder information 
is ( , , )H A C B E . This rate must be sent by Alice and Charlie and depending on the portion of transmitted 
information by each of them, there is a tradeoff between the equivocation rates.  
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Achievability of corollary 2 can be obtained by setting U E= and V as constant value in theorem 1. For the 
converse part of corollary 2, from equation (12) of theorem 2, we have: 
max{ ( ; , ) ( ; )} max{ ( ; , , )} max{ ( ; , , )}
    ( ; , )                                                                                                          (30)
A I A B V U I A E U I A B V U E I A B C U E
I A B C E
∆ ≤ − ≤ ≤
≤
 
Equation (30) is the result of ( , ) ( , )U A E B C− − Markov chain. We note that when Alice has access to Eve’s 
side information, the source A will be replaced with ,A E . Similarly equations (28) and (29) can be deduced. 
Case 3.Bob’s side information at Alice: In this case, it is assumed that Bob’s side information (source B) is 
available at Alice and the inner and outer bounds of theorems 1 and 2 hold where the auxiliary random variables 
U and V are according to the joint distribution ( , , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , ) ( )p a b c e u v p a b c e p u a b p v c= in theorem 1 and 
form Markov chains as ( , ) ( , )U A B C E− − and ( , , )V C A B E− − in theorem 2. 
It should be noted that the availability of either Eve’s or Bob’s side information at Alice enlarges the space of 
auxiliary random variable U and can potentially result in higher equivocation rates at the eavesdropper. From 
the Slepian-Wolf source coding, it is known that the availability of receiver’s side information at the senders 
does not result in compression rates improvement, but this is not true in the case of equivocation rates. We show 
via an example that availability of Bob’s side information at Alice increases equivocation rate of Eve with 
respect to Alice’s source. This example is an extension of the example in lemma 4.2 in [10].   
It is evident that when A is independent of ( , )B C  and Alice does not have access to B , then =0A∆ . However 
when she has access to B , she can use it as a key to encrypt her message. 
Corollary 4.3: When A is independent of ( , )B C , B is independent of E and Alice has access to B , then 
( , )A C∆ ∆  is achievable if and only if:
 
 
min{ ( ) ( ; ), ( )}                                                                (31)
max{ ( ; ) ( ; )}                                                                    (32)
A
C
H B I A E H A E
I C B V I C E V
∆ ≤ −
∆ ≤ −
 
where the maximization is over the auxiliary random variableV which forms Markov chain as ( , )V C B E− − . 
For achieving the equivocation rate of equation (31), Alice uses B as secret key to encrypt her message. In 
fact, one time pad encryption system is established due to the fact that B is independent of
 
E . First, Alice 
compresses the source A and then encrypts it by xoring with the bits of the key
 
B . In this way, two situations 
can be occurred; if ( ) ( )H B H A≥ , then Alice can encrypt her message entirely with the key and hence, 
equivocation rate at Eve is H( A E ) with respect to Alice’s source. If ( ) ( )H B H A< then, Alice should send 
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some part of her message as cleartext and so, equivocation rate at Eve with respect to Alice’s source 
is ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ; )H A E H A H B H B I A E− − = − . Achievability of equation (32) follows from equation (5) of 
theorem 1 and independency of A and C . The converse can be obtained from equations (12) and (13) of 
theorem 2. 
Case 4.Bob’s and Eve’s side information at Alice: In this case Bob’s and Eve’s side information (source 
B and E ) is available at Alice. Also in this case, the inner and outer bounds of theorems 1 and 2 hold with the 
difference that the auxiliary random variables U and V that are according to the joint distribution 
( , , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , ) ( )p a b c e u v p a b c e p u a b e p v c= in theorem 1 and form Markov chains as ( , , )U A B E C− − and 
( , , )V C A B E− − in theorem 2. 
Similar to two previous cases, availability of Eve’s and Bob’s side information at Alice can potentially result 
in higher equivocation rates at the eavesdropper. However, if the observation of Eve is a physically degraded 
version of Bob’s information, i.e. A B E− − form a Markov chain, then providing Eve’s side information to 
Alice can not improve the equivocation rates [9]. 
Another special case occurs when Eve’s side information is available at Bob in addition to his source B .  
Case 5.Eve’s side information at Bob: In this case, availability of Eve’s side information (source E ) at Bob 
makes Eve’s side information physically degraded with respect to Bob’s side information because the trivial 
Markov chains ( , )A B E E− − and ( , )C B E E− − hold. Hence according to corollary 3.1, Slepian-Wolf coding 
suffices for maximizing equivocation rates. 
Corollary 4.4: When Eve’s side information is available at Bob, then the quadruple rate ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆  is 
achievable if and only if:
 
( , , )                                                                                             (33)
( , , )                                                                               
A
C
R H A B C E
R H C A B E
≥
≥               (34)
( , , )                                                                                    (35)
0 ( ; , )                                                                  
A C
A
R R H A C B E
I A B C E
+ ≥
≤ ∆ ≤                        (36)
0 ( ; , )                                                                                         (37)
0 ( ; , ) ( ; ) ( , ; ) ( ; )              (38)
C
A C
A A
I C A B E
I A B C E I B C E I A B C E I A B E
R
≤ ∆ ≤
≤ ∆ +∆ ≤ + = +
+ ∆ ≥ ( )                                                                                              (39)  
( )                                                                                    C C
H A E
R H C E+ ∆ ≥           (40)     
 
The achievability can be obtained from theorem 1 by replacing B with ( , )B E and considering the auxiliary 
random variables
 
U and V constant. The converse is followed by theorem 2. 
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5   Conclusion 
In this paper, secure distributed compression of two sources was considered. In the studied model, the 
eavesdropper had access to side information and intercepted one of the channels at a time. In this model, two 
equivocation and compression rates were defined. The inner and outer bounds of rate quadruples 
( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆  were given in theorems 1 and 2 which did not generally match. This model contained the 
cases studied in [8], [9] and [10] and therefore could be referred to as a generalized model. In the coding 
scheme, combination of random coding and Slepian-Wolf were used and it was seen that there was a trade-off 
between two equivocation rates. Furthermore, some special cases are discussed in which the inner and outer 
bounds matched. The first special case happens when Eve has no side information. The compression-
equivocation capacity region for this case in corollary 4.1 is an extension of the previously obtained one in [8]. 
Availability of Bob's or Eve's side information or both at Alice and availability of Eve's side information at Bob 
provide other special cases where compression-equivocation capacity region is given for each case. These cases 
were in agreement with the results obtained in this subject previously.  
 As the future work, the same problem can be regarded when the communication is two-way via public channel, 
i.e. Bob can also transmit data to Alice and Charlie. This leads in less leakage rate. In addition, the problem can 
be more generalized in a way that either there are multiple receiver with different side information that should 
decode the Alice's and Charlie's sources or there are multiple eavesdroppers with different side information that 
listen to one of the channels at a time.      
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 11 
In proof of achievability, we consider two rate quadruples ( , , , )A C A CR R ∆ ∆ and prove the equations of theorem 1 
for them.  We choose U  and V  with distributions ( )p u a  and ( )p v c  which satisfy the condition of theorem 
1. Then, we generate ( ( ; ) )1N I A U B2 ε+ codewords of length N , ( )N 1U w  for 
( ( ; ) ){ ,..., }1N I A U B1w 1 2 ε+∈
 
with 
the distribution ( )N ii 1 p u=∏ . Now, these codewords are randomly binned into  ( ( ; , ) )2N I A U V B2 ε+ bins. The 
related bin index of a codeword ( )N 1U w  is denoted as ( )1a w . Also all NA  sequences are randomly binned  
                                                        
1
 Like [10], we assume deterministic coding in the analysis for simplicity, but the proofs follow similarly for randomized coding which is 
modeled by assuming independent random variables at the terminals and deterministic coding functions that depend on these random 
variables. 
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into ( ( , , ) )3N H A B C U2 ε+ bins and for a sequence NA , the related bin index is denoted as ( )Nb A . On the other 
hand, we similarly generate ( ( ; ) )4N I C V B2 ε+ codewords of length N , ( )N 2V w for 
( ( ; ) ){ ,..., }4N I C V B2w 1 2 ε+∈ with distribution ( )
N
ii 1
p v
=
∏ . Also all NC sequences are randomly binned into 
( ( , , ) )5N H C V U B2 ε+ and the bin index of a sequence NC is denoted as ( )Nc C .  
Now, we describe the encoding and decoding schemes for achievability of the following rate quadruple that 
satisfies equations (1), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) of theorem 1: 
( , ) - ( ; , , )
( , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) - ( ; )
( ; , ) - ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A V B I A C U V B
R H C U B I U V B
I A B C U I A E U
I C U B V I C E V
 = 
 
= + 
 ∆ = 
 ∆ = 
 
in which U  and V are random variables with the distribution of theorem 1.  
For a typical observation of NA , Alice finds a jointly typical sequence ( )N 1U w . It can be seen that this 
sequence is unique with a high probability. Then, for the sequences ( )N 1U w
 
and NA , she detects the related 
index bins i.e. ( )1a w and ( )Nb A , respectively. These index bins are transmitted as Alice’s encoding function 
and are received by Bob and Eve. For a typical observation of NC , Charlie finds the related bin ( )Nc C  and also 
the typical sequence ( )N 2V w which is unique with high probability. Then he sends the index ( )2w  and ( )Nc C
 
as his encoding function to Bob and Eve. 
For decoding, Bob with access to side information sequences NB  and index ( )2w , finds the related typical 
sequence ( )N 2V w and then with this sequence, side information sequences NB  and the bin index ( )1a w , he can 
find a typical ( )N 1U w  with high probability. With access to ( )N 1U w ,
 
side information sequences NB  and the 
bin index ( )Nc C , Bob decodes NC reliably with high probability and subsequently, he can correctly decode 
NA
 
with access to the received bin index ( )Nb A , the sequences ( )N 1U w , NC and NB . The transmitted rates 
from Alice and Charlie are now calculated. If i 0ε → for ,...,i 1 5= , we have: 
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( ; , ) ( , , ) ( , ) - ( ; , , )                    (41)
( ; ) ( , , ) ( ) ( ; , )
    ( ) ( , ) ( , , )
    ( ) ( , ) ( , )                                             
A
C
R I A U V B H A U C B H A V B I A C U V B
R I C V B H C U V B H C B I C U V B
H C B H U V B H U V B C
H C B H U V B H U B C
= + =
= + = −
= − +
= − +             (42)
    ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ; )
     ( , ) ( ; )                               
( , ) - ( ; , , ) ( ; ) ( , , )
          ( , ) ( , , ) ( ; )
          ( , , )
A C
H C B H U B H U B C I U V B
H C U B I U V B
R R H A V B I A C U V B I C V B H C U V B
H A V B H C A V B I C V B
H A C V B
= − + +
= +
+ = + +
= + +
= + ( ; ) ( ) - ( , ) ( , , )                       
          ( ) ( , , )                  
          ( ) ( , ) ( , )
I C V B H C B H C V B H A C V B
H C B H A V B C
H C B H A C B H A C B
= +
= +
= + =
 
where equation (41) follows from the fact that ( , , , ) ( , , )H A U V C B H A U C B= which is the direct result of V  
distribution. Also equation (42) exploits from the equality ( , , ) ( , )H U V B C H U B C= . 
Now, the equivocation rates can be lower bounded as: 
1
1 1
1
3
( ( ), ( ), )
       ( ) - ( ; ( ), ) - ( ; ( ) ( ), )
        ( ( ), ) - ( ( ))
       ( , ) - ( , , ) -                                                  (43)
       [ (
N N N
A
N N N N N N
N N N
N N N
N H A a w b A E
H A I A a w E I A b A a w E
H A a w E H b A
H A U E NH A U B C N
N H
ε
∆ =
=
≥
≥
= 3 3
2
2 2
2
5
, ) - ( , , ) - ] [ ( ; , ) - ( ; ) - ]   (44)
 ( , ( ), )
        ( ) - ( ; , ) - ( ; ( ) , )
        ( ( ), ) - ( ( ))
        ( , ) - ( , , ) - [ ( , ) - ( , , )
N N N
C
N N N N N N
N N N
N N N
A U E H A U B C N I A B C U I A E U
N H C w c C E
H C I C w E I C c C w E
H C V w E H c C
H C V E NH C U V B N N H C V E H C U V B
ε ε
ε
=
∆ =
=
≥
≥ = 5
5
- ]
        [ ( ; , ) - ( ; ) - ]                                                            (45)N I C U B V I C E V
ε
ε=
 
Equation (43) follows from the data processing inequality. Also we have: 
3 5
3 5
3 5
( , ) - ( , , ) ( , ) - ( , , ) - ( )
             ( , ) ( , ) - ( , , , ) - ( )                    (46)
              ( , ; , , ) - ( ; , ) - ( ; , ) ( ; ) - ( )                 
A C H A U E H A U B C H C V E H C U V B
H A U E H C V E H A C U V B
I A C U V B I A U E I C V E I A C
ε ε
ε ε
ε ε
∆ + ∆ = + +
= + +
= + +             
 
In deriving equation (46), the equality ( , , ) ( , , , )H A U B C H A U B V C= is used which is the consequence of 
 V distribution. 
Finally, we have: 
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1 1
1  
2 2
( ( ), ( ), ) ( ) - ( ; ( ), ( ) )
        ( ) - ( ( ), ( ))  ( ) -                                    (47)
( ( ), ( ), ) ( ) - ( ; , ( ) )
         ( ) - ((
N N N N N N N N
A
N
A
N N N N N N N N
C
N H A a w b A E H A E I A a w b A E
NH A E H a w b A NH A E NR
N H C w c C E H C E I C w c C E
NH C E H
∆ = =
≥ ≥
∆ = =
≥ ), ( )) ( ) -                                     (48)N N CV c C NH C E NR≥
 
Considering equations (41), (44), (45), (46), (47) and (48), equations (1), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) of theorem 
1 are satisfied.  
On the other hand, by symmetry, we describe the encoding and decoding schemes for achievability of the 
following rate quadruple that satisfies equations (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of theorem 1: 
( , ) ( ; )
( , ) ( ; , , )
( ; , ) - ( ; )
( ; , ) - ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A V B I U V B
R H C U B I A C U V B
I A V B U I A E U
I C A B V I C E V
 = + 
 
= − 
 ∆ = 
 ∆ = 
 
in which U  and V are random variables with the distribution of theorem 1.  
This coding and decoding is a bit modified version of the previous one. First, with fix 
distributions ( )p u a and ( )p v c , the codewords ( )N 1U w and ( )N 2V w are generated similar to previous coding 
scheme. Then, all NA  sequences are randomly binned into ( ( , , ) )3N H A U V B2 ε+ bins in which for a 
sequence NA , the related bin index is denoted as ( )Nb A . Also N-length codewords ( )N 2V w are randomly 
binned into ( ; , )NI C V U B2 bins and the related bin index of a codeword ( )N 2V w is denoted as ( )2a w and all 
NC sequences are randomly binned into ( , , )NH C V A B2 and the related bin index is denoted as ( )Nc C . For a 
typical observation of NA , Alice finds a jointly typical sequence ( )N 1U w  which is unique with a high 
probability. Then, for the ( )N 1U w
 
and NA , she detects the related index bins ( )Nb A and sends ( )1w and  
( )Nb A  to Bob and Eve. For a typical observation of
 
NC , Charlie finds the typical sequence ( )N 2V w and then 
finds the bin indices of these two sequence i.e. ( )2a w and ( )Nc C , respectively. 
It can be seen that similar to the previous decoding scheme, Bob can reliably decode NA
 
and NC with high 
probability. Now, the same parameters can be calculated (the procedure is the same as before and so details are 
omitted): 
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( ; ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( ; )                                    (49)
( ; , ) ( , , )  ( , ) - ( ; , , )                        (50)
 ( , )                                       
A
C
A C
R I A U B H A U V B H A V B I U V B
R I C V U B H C V A B H C U B I A C U V B
R R H A C B
= + = +
= + =
+ =
1 3
3
                                                    (51)
( , ( ), ) [ ( , ) - ( , , ) - ]
       [ ( ; , ) - ( ; ) - ]                                                                  (52
N N N
AN H A w b A E N H A U E H A U V B
N I A V B U I A E U
ε
ε
∆ = =
=
5
5
3 5
)
 ( ( 2), ( ), ) [ ( , ) - ( , , ) - ]
       [ ( ; , ) - ( ; ) - ]                                                                  (53)
( , ) - ( , , ) ( , ) - ( , , ) - ( )
 
N N N
C
A C
N H C a w c C E N H C V E H C A B V
N I C A B V I C E V
H A U E H A U V B H C V E H C V A B
ε
ε
ε ε
∆ = =
=
∆ + ∆ = + +
3 5
3 5
1 1
1
          ( , ) ( , ) - ( , , , ) - ( )
           ( , ; , , ) - ( ; , ) - ( ; , ) ( ; ) - ( )                   (54)   
( , ( ), ) ( ) - ( ; , ( ) )
         ( ) - ( , (
N N N N N N N N
A
H A U E H C V E H A C U V B
I A C U V B I A U E I C V E I A C
N H A w b A E H A E I A w b A E
NH A E H w b A
ε ε
ε ε
= + +
= + +
∆ = =
≥
2 2
2
)) ( ) -                                             (55)
( ( ), ( ), ) ( ) - ( ; ( ), ( ) )
         ( ) - (( ( ), ( )) ( ) -                                       (56)
N
A
N N N N N N N N
C
N
C
NH A E NR
N H C a w c C E H C E I C a w c C E
NH C E H a w c C NH C E NR
≥
∆ = =
≥ ≥
 
It can be seen that with this coding scheme, equations (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of theorem 1 are satisfied 
with considering equations (50), (51), (53), (54), (55) and (56).  
In both above coding schemes, the sum rates of compression rates and equivocation rates are the same.  
Now, achievability of the two rate quadruples is proved. We avoid detailed proof of achievability of the total 
region of theorem 1and content ourselves with a proof scheme.  
In both of the above coding scheme, at the first step, Alice and Charlie use auxiliary random variables U  and 
V and send information with the total rate ( , ; , ) ( , ) - ( ) - ( )I A C U V B H U V B H U A H V C= . At the second step, Alice 
and Charlie should send total rate ( , , , )H A C U V B so that Bob can reconstruct both of the sources. The portion of 
transmitted rates by each of Alice or Charlie at both steps determines the trade-off between the compression 
rates i.e. AR  and CR , while sum of them is fixed. Division of transmitted rates at the second step determines the 
trade-off between two equivocation rates i.e. A∆ and C∆ , while sum of them is fixed. Therefore, four cases can 
happen that in all of them, the compression sum rate and the equivocation sum rate are fixed and equal to 
equations (3) and (6), respectively. We discus these cases as follows:  
1-Alice sends information with the rate of ( ; ) ( ) - ( , )I A U B H A B H A U B=  at the first step and then 
information with the rate of ( , , )H A U V B  at the second step. Charlie sends information with the rate of 
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( ; , ) ( , ) ( , , )I C V U B H C U B H C U V B= −  at the first step and then information with the rate of ( , , )H C V A B  
at the second step. So we have: 
( ) - ( ; , ) ( , ) ( ; )
( , ) ( ; , , )
( ; , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A B I A V U B H A V B I U V B
R H C U B I A C U V B
I A V B U I A E U
I C A B V I C E V
 = = + 
 
= − 
 ∆ = − 
 ∆ = − 
 
  2-Alice sends information with the rate of ( ; , ) ( , ) ( , , )I A U V B H A V B H A U V B= − at the first step and 
then information with the rate of ( , , )H A U V B  at the second step. Charlie sends information with rate of 
( ; ) ( ) ( , )I C V B H C B H C V B= − at the first step and then information with the rate of ( , , )H C V A B  at the 
second step. So we have: 
( , )
( ) ( ; , )
( ; , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A V B
R H C B I A C V B
I A V B U I A E U
I C A B V I C E V
 = 
 
= − 
 ∆ = − 
 ∆ = − 
 
3-Alice sends information with the rate of ( ; ) ( ) - ( , )I A U B H A B H A U B= at the first step and then 
information with the rate of ( , , )H A U B C at the second step. Charlie sends information with the rate of 
( ; , ) ( , ) ( , , )I C V U B H C U B H C U V B= −  at the first step and then information with the rate of 
( , , )H C U V B at the second step. So we have: 
( ) ( ; , )
( , )
( ; , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A B I A C U B
R H C U B
I A B C U I A E U
I C U B V I C E V
 = − 
 
= 
 ∆ = − 
 ∆ = − 
 
  4-Alice sends information with the rate of ( ; , ) ( , ) ( , , )I A U V B H A V B H A U V B= −  at the first step and 
then information with the rate of ( , , )H A U B C  at the second step. Charlie sends information with the rate of 
( ; ) ( ) ( , )I C V B H C B H C V B= − at the first step and then information with the rate of ( , , )H C U V B  at the 
second step. So we have: 
( , ) ( ; , , )
( ) ( ; , ) ( , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) ( ; )
( ; , ) ( ; )
A
C
A
C
R H A V B I A C U V B
R H C B I C U V B H C U B I U V B
I A B C U I A E U
I C U B V I C E V
 = − 
 
= − = + 
 ∆ = − 
 ∆ = − 
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It can be seen that in the first and second cases the individual equivocation rates are the same but the 
transmitted rates are different. Using time sharing according to theorem g. of [11], the other rate quadruples 
between these points are achievable. The same is true for third and forth cases and hence, the achievability of 
the theorem 1 region is satisfied.     
 
Proof of theorem 2 
The stochastic functions AF  and CF  are defined as ( )NA AF f A= , ( )NC CF f C= . Fano’s inequality leads to  
( , , , ) ( )                                                                                (57)N N N NA C eH A C B F F N Pα≤  
where (.)α  is a non-negative function with lim ( )
x 0
x 0α
→
= . Now, we define: 
-1 -1
-1 -1
( , , )                                                                                  (58)
( , , )                                                                                  
i A i i
i C i i
U F A E
V F C E
=
= (59)  
It can be seen that ( , , )i i i i iU A B C E− − and ( , , )i i i i iV C A B E− − are Markov chains. We have: 
-1 -1
1
( ) ( , ) ( , , ) - ( , , ) 
        ( , ) - ( )                                                                      (60)
       ( , , , ) - ( )
      
N N N N N
A A A C A C A C
N N N
C e
N
N i i N
i C e
i
i
NR H F H F B F H A F B F H A B F F
H A B F N P
H A B F A C N P
α
α
=
=
≥ ≥ =
≥
≥
=
∑
-1 -1
1
-1
1
( , , , ) - ( )                                                       (61)
       ( , , ) - ( )                                                             (62)
      
N
i i N
i i C e
N
i N
i i C e
i
i
H A B F A C N P
H A B F C N P
α
α
=
=
=
≥
∑
∑
-1 -1
1 1
1 1
( , , , ) - ( ) ( , ) - ( )
      ( , ) - ( ; , , ) - ( )                                          
N N
i i N N
i i C e i i i e
i
N N
N
i i i i i i i i e
i i
H A B F C E N P H A V B N P
H A V B I A C U V B N P
α α
α
=
= =
=
≥
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
where equation (60) follows from Fano’s inequality and equation (61) from the memoryless property. Equation 
(62) is the result of Markov chain - -( , , )i 1 i 1i i CA B F C A− − .  
Similarly, it can be deduced that: 
1 1
( , ) - ( ; , , ) - ( )                                  (63)
N N
N
C i i i i i i i i e
i i
NR H C U B I A C U V B N Pα
= =
≥∑ ∑  
Also we have: 
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( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) - ( )          (64)N N N NA C A C A C eNR NR H F H F H F F H A C B N Pα+ ≥ + ≥ ≥  
For the equivocation rates: 
-1 -1
1 1
-1 -1
( , ) ( ) - ( ; )
       ( , , ) ( ; , ) - ( ; )
      ( ) ( ; , , ) - ( , ) ( ,  )                  (65)
( ) ( ; , , ,
N N N N N
A A A A
N N N N N N
A C C A A
N N
N N i i N N
e i C A i A A
i i
N N i i
e i C A
N H A F E H A F I A E F
H A F F B I A F B F I A E F
N P I A F B F A H E F E H E A F
N P I A F B F A E
α
α
= =
∆ = =
= +
≤ + +
≤ +
∑ ∑
-1 -1
1 1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1
1 1
-1 -1 -1 -1
1
) - ( , , ) ( )                 (66)
( ) ( ; , , , , ) - ( , , ) ( )            
( ) ( ; , , , , , ) - ( ,
N N
i i N N
i A
i i
N N
N N i i i i i N N
e i C A i A
i i
N
N N i i i i i
e i C A i A
i
H E F E A H E A
N P I A F B C F A E H E F E A H E A
N P I A F B C E F A E H E F E
α
α
= =
= =
=
+
≤ + +
= +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ -1 -1
1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
1 1
1 1
1
, ) ( )
( ) ( ; , , , , , ) - ( , , ) ( )     (67)
  ( ) ( ; , ) - [ ( ) - ( )]  
        ( ) ( ; , ) - (
N
i N N
i
N N
N i i i i i i N N
e i C i A i A
i i
N N
N
e i i i i i i i i
i i
N
N
e i i i i
i
A H E A
N P I A F B C E F A E H E F E A H E A
N P I A B V U H E U H E A
N P I A B V U I A
α
α
α
=
= =
= =
=
+
= + +
= +
= +
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
1
; )                                                             (68)
N
i i i
i
E U
=
∑  
where (65) follows from Fano’s inequality; (66)  from memoryless property and the fact that conditioning 
reduces entropy. Equation (67) is derived from memoryless property and equation (68) from i i iU A E− −  
Markov chain.  
In a similar way it can be shown that:  
1 1
 ( ) ( ; , ) - ( ; )                                    (69) 
N N
N
C e i i i i i i i
i i
N N P I C B U V I C E Vα
= =
∆ ≤ +∑ ∑  
On the other hand, we have:  
( , , , ) ( )
( , , ) - ( , ; , ) ( )
( , , ) ( , ) - ( , ) ( , ; ) ( )
( ,  ) - ( ) - ( ) ( , ; ) ( )
( ) -  ( ) - ( ) ( | ) ( , ; ) (
N N N N
A C e
N N N N N N
A C A C e
N N N N N N N N
A C A C e
N N N N N N
A C e
N N N N N N N
A C e
H A C F F B N P
H A C F F I A C B F F N P
H F F A C H A C H F F I A C B N P
H A C H F H F I A C B N P
H A H F H F H C A I A C B N P
α
α
α
α
α
≤
≤
+ + ≤
+ ≤
+ + ≤ )
( ) - ( ) - ( ) ( ) ( , ; ) ( )
( , )  ( ) - ( , ; ) ( )
( ) - ( , ) ( )  ( ; ) - ( , ) ( )       (70)
N N N N N N N N
A A C e
N N N N N N N N
A C e
N N
A C e C e
H A F H F A H F H C A I A C B N P
H A F E H C A NR I A C B N P
R H A H A C B P R I A B H C A B P
α
α
α α
+ + ≤
+ + ≤
∆ ≤ + + = + +
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Similarly, it can be seen that:  
( ) - ( , ) ( ) ( ; ) - ( , ) ( )           (71)N NC A e A eR H C H A C B P R I C B H A B C Pα α∆ ≤ + + = + +  
Also we have 
( , , , ) ( )
( , , ) - ( , ; , ) ( )
( , , ) ( , ) - ( , ) - ( , ; ) ( )
( ) ( ) - ( , ) - ( ) - ( ) - ( , ; ) ( )
( ) - ( ) ( ) - ( ) (
N N N N
A C e
N N N N N N
A C A C e
N N N N N N N N
A C A C e
N N N N N N N N
A C e
N N N N
A A C C
H A C F F B N P
H A C F F I A C B F F N P
H F F A C H A C H F F I A C B N P
H A H C I A C H F H F I A C B N P
H A F H F A H C F H F C I A
α
α
α
α
≤
≤
+ ≤
+ ≤
+ ≤ ; ) ( , ; ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ; ) ( , ; ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( ; ) ( , ; ) ( )
( ; ) ( , ; ) ( )                                                     
N N N N N N
e
N N N N N N N N
A C e
N N N N N N N N N N
A C e
N
A C e
C I A C B N P
H A F H C F I A C I A C B N P
H A F E H C F E I A C I A C B N P
I A C I A C B P
α
α
α
α
+ +
+ ≤ + +
+ ≤ + +
∆ + ∆ ≤ + +         (72)
 
Also, it can be deduced: 
1 1( ) ( , ) [ ( ) ( , )]
( ) 
                                                                                    (73)
1 1( ) ( , ) [ ( ) ( , )]
             
N N N N N
A A A
A
A A A
N N N N N
C C C
H A E H A F E H F E H A E F
N N
H F
R
N
H C E H C F E H F E H C E F
N N
≤ = +
≤ + ∆ = + ∆
≤ = +
( ) 
                                                                       (74)C C C C
H F
R
N
≤ + ∆ = + ∆
 
 
Finally, if a random variable Q  with uniform distribution over { , , ..., }1 2 N and other random variables as: 
 , , , , ( , ), ( , )Q Q Q Q Q QA A B B C C E E U U Q V V Q= = = = = =  
are definedand, then the equations (9)-(18) are satisfied if we consider equations (62), (63), (64), (68), (69), 
(70), (71), (72), (73), (74) and  let N → ∞  and 0NeP →  . 
 
 
